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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
claiming personal liability and seeking the clients express authority
in this situation may be the stitch in time that saved nine.
ALGERNON L. BUTLER, JR.
Bankruptcy-Exemptions-Life Insurance Policies With Reserved
Right to Change Beneficiary
The issue in In Matter of Wolfe1 was whether cash surrender
values of insurance policies on the life of the bankrupt were exempt
from the claims of a trustee in bankruptcy. Both policies named the
wife as beneficiary, but reserved to the bankrupt husband the ab-
solute right to change the beneficiary. In claiming that the cash
surrender values of the policies were exempt, the bankrupt relied
on both statutory' and constitutional" provisions. The court held
that the statute was a void attempt to extend the insurance exemp-
tion fixed in the constitution and that "the cash surrender values
of . .. [the] policies are not exempt property under the Constitu-
tion ... of North Carolina . .."
As of the date of the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the trustee
acquires title to all propery of the bankrupt5 except that which is
held to be exempt.' An insurance policy is property that would
1249 F. Supp. 784 (M.D.N.C. 1966).
' The relevant portion of the statutory provision reads as follows:
If a policy of insurance is effected by any person on his own life...
in favor of a person other than himself ... the lawful beneficiary
... thereof, other than the insured or the executor or administrator of
such insured .. . shall be entitled to its proceeds and avails against
creditors and representatives of the insured ...whether or not the
right to change the beneficiary is reserved or permitted ....
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-206 (1965).
'The relevant portion of the constitution provides as follows:
The husband may insure his own life for the sole use and benefit of
his wife ... and in case of the death of the husband the amount thus
insured shall be paid over to the wife ... for her . . . own use, free
from all the claims of the representatives of her husband, or any of
his creditors. And the policy shall not be subject to claims of creditors
of the insured during the life of the insured, if the insurance issued
is for the sole use and benefit of the wife ....
N.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 7.
'249 F. Supp. at 786.
Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879(a) (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1964).
' "This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts of the exemptions
which are prescribed.., by the State laws ..... " Bankruptcy Act § 6, 52
Stat. 847 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 24 (1964).
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pass to the trustee absent some exempting provisions.7 When the in-
sured reserves the right to change the beneficiary at will and could
name his estate or representative as beneficiary, there is property
that vests in the trustee." However, if the policy or any rights or
proceeds under it are exempt from the claims of creditors, the policy
is exempt from the claims of the bankruptcy trustee.' Thus even
though the right to change the beneficiary is reserved, the policy is
not subject to the claims of the trustee if such a policy is exempt
under state law.'0
Prior to 1932 the North Carolina constitutional provision ex-
empting insurance provided that on the death of the husband, the
amount of insurance on his life payable to his wife should be paid
to her free from the claims of the husband's creditors." The con-
stitution did not contain the provision that a policy issued for the
benefit of a wife should be exempt from the claims of the husband's
creditors during his life. However, the legislature had enacted a
statute providing that when a policy was made payable to a married
woman, it inured to her separate use and benefit. 2 In 1925 the
Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459 (1913). See generally, Annots.,
68 A.L.R. 1215 (1930), 103 A.L.R. 239 (1936), and 169 A.L.R. 1380
(1947).
The bankrupt may keep the policy alive and free from the claims of
creditors by paying to the trustee an amount equal to the cash surrender
value of the policy. The saving clause provides as follows:
That when any bankrupt, who is a natural person, shall have any in-
surance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself,
his estate, or personal representatives, he may . . . pay or secure
to the trustee the sum . . . stated, and continue to hold, own, and
carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating
in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy proceedings,
otherwise the policy shall pass to the trustee as assets ....
Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (5), 52 Stat. 879(a) (5) (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110
(a) (5) (1964). See Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U.S. 202 (1907) (defining
cash surrender value for purposes of this section).
8 Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U.S. 50 (1917). The Bankruptcy Act gives the
trustee title to powers which the bankrupt could exercise for his own
benefit. Bankruptcy Act § 70(a) (3), 52 Stat. 879(a) (3) (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(a)(3) (1964).
Holden v. Stratton, 198 U.S. 202 (1905). The bankrupt may commit
acts that affect the insurance exemption. See Comment, 1961 DuKE L.J.
569.
" In re Messinger, 29 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1928).
"
1N.C. CONsT. art. X, § 7 (1868). For a historical analysis of the North
Carolina insurance exemption provisions and the cases thereunder, see
Faris, Exemption of Insurance and Other Property in the Virginias and
Carolinas, 17 WASH. & LEE L. RIv. 19, 32-36 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Faris].
" N.C. GEr. STAT. § 58-205 (1965).
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United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Whiting
v. Squires'3 considered whether these provisions exempted from the
claims of the trustee the cash surrender value of an insurance policy
naming the bankrupt's wife as beneficiary, but reserving to the
husband the absolute right to change the beneficiary. The court in
Squires felt that such a construction of the statute14 would confer
an exemption beyond that allowed by the North Carolina constitu-
tional provision. Thus the court held:
The limit of the constitutional exemption.., is that the wife
or the wife and children take the benefits of a policy payable to
her or them as beneficiaries at the death of the insured. The
exemption may cover a policy payable to the wife and children
with no power of the insured to change the beneficiaries, because
in such a policy the wife or the wife and children have a vested
interest, and the policy, if paid at all, must be paid to them at the
death of the husband. But the exemption does not embrace the
surrender value, the property of the husband, of a policy in
which he can change the beneficiary at will.' 5
Subsequent to Squires, the constitutional provision was amended
by adding a provision exempting the policy from the claims of the
husband's creditors during his life if the policy was issued for the
sole benefit and use of the wife."0 At the same time the legislature
added a statutory provision exempting the proceeds and avails of in-
surance policies, regardless of whether the right to change the bene-
ficiary was reserved.'
It seems that the subsequent amendment and statute were in-
tended to overcome the result in Squires.' Thus the basic issue
before the court in the Wolfe case was whether this outcome was
achieved. In the absence of a conflict with the constitutional pro-
vision, the statute would exempt the policy from the claims of the
"6 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 587 (1925).
14 Statutes similar to the one in question have been construed to exempt
the cash surrender value even though the right to change the beneficiary is
reserved. E.g., In re Reiter, 58 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1932); Magnuson v.
Wagner, 1 F.2d 99 (8th Cir. 1924); In re La Tourette, 23 F. Supp. 631(E.D. Mo. 1938); Brown v. Home Life Ins. Co., 3 F.2d 661 (E.D. Okia.
1925); Slurszberg v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 Atl. 451 (N.J. 1936).
15 hiting v. Squires, 6 F.2d 100, 01-02 (4th Cir. 1925), cert. denied,
269 U.S. 487 (1925).
" N.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 7. See note 3 supra.
"
7N.C. Sess. Laws 1931, ch. 179, § 1, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-206 (1965).
See note 2 supra.
"Faris at 36. See note 21 infra.
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trustee.' However, the statutory provision must be considered in
light of the North Carolina view that the legislature cannot by
statute add to an exemption specified in the constitution.2" The
trustee's claim is ultimately resolved by determining whether the
present constitutional provision allows exemption during the hus-
band's life when the right to change the beneficiary is reserved. In
reaching its result, the court in Wolfe concluded that the constitu-
tional amendment did not overrule Squires." It held that the wives
and children are protected from the claims of the husband's creditors
during his life only when the policies are for their sole benefit and
that the provision does not exempt the policies when the bankrupt
has the power to change beneficiaries.2
It seems the court felt that insurance is not for the sole benefit
of the wife when the husband has the right to change the bene-
ficiary.23 In reaching the result in the Wolfe case, the court ap-
parently assumed that this was the basis of the Squires decision.
The true basis of the Squires decision, however, is that the exemp-
tion was granted only for the amounts to be paid over to the wife
in the case of the husband's death.24 The constitutional provision
interpreted provided that on the death of the husband, "the amount
thus insured shall be paid over to the wife ... free from all claims
of . . . creditors. 25 It appears that the cases relied on26 by the
19E.g., In re Messinger, 29 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1928); In re Beckman,
50 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ala. 1943).
"°Wharton v. Taylor, 88 N.C. 230 (1883). The case involved the
validity of an attempt by the legislature to expand the homestead exemption
beyond the limits specified in the state constitution. See Aycock, Home-
stead Exemption In North Carolina, 29 N.C.L. REv. 143, 144 (1951).
" 249 F. Supp. at 786.
By reading the 1931 statutory amendment and the constitutional
amendment together, there is reason to believe that the legislature
did intend to limit the effect of the Squires case. So far as the
constitutional amendment alone is concerned, however, the wording
clearly falls short of overruling Squires. At the same time the
statutory amendment seems to be just another unconstitutional at-
tempt . . .at expanding the insurance exemption.
Faris at 36.
2 249 F. Supp. at 786.2 In determining the extent of the exemption granted by the amended
constitutional provision, "the principal problem will be in determining what
policies are for their sole benefit." Faris at 36.
2, See text accompanying note 16 supra.
"N.C. CoNsT. art. X, § 7 (1868).
28Morgan v. McCaffrey, 286 F. 922 (5th Cir. 1923) (whenever any
person shall die); In re Morgan, 282 F. 650 (S.D. Fla. 1922) (when person
dies); In re Long, 282 F. 383 (S.D. Fla. 1918) (whenever any person
dies).
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Squires court involve construction of the scope of provisions pur-
porting to exempt proceeds payable at the death of the insured,
rather than a determination that insurance is not for the sole benefit
and use of the beneficiary merely because the right to change is
reserved.
It is submitted that the 1932 amendment does overrule the
Squires decision. This is because the amendment purports to grant
exemption during the life of the insured husband and, in addition,
applies to the policy rather than the proceeds payable at death.
Exemption of the policy itself should exempt the cash surrender
value from the claims of the bankruptcy trustee.17 Thus the result
in Wolfe seems to be founded on the idea that the policy is not is-
sued for the sole benefit of the wife if the husband retains the right
to change the beneficiary. Such a restrictive construction, coupled
with the modern practice of reserving the right to change bene-
ficiaries,2" would make the constitutional provision a virtual nullity.
The insurance is for the benefit of the wife if, at the time of the
bankruptcy, she is named as beneficiary and the power to change
has not been exercised, 29 and reservation of the power to change the
beneficiary should not deprive the policy of the characteristic of
"7 See It re La Tourette, 23 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Mo. 1938). And where
the provision purports to exempt the "proceeds and avails," the courts hold
the cash surrender value is exempt. E.g., Pearl v. Goldberg, 300 F.2d 610(2d Cir. 1962); It re Messinger, 29 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1928); In re Beck-
man, 50 F. Supp. 339 (N.D. Ala. 1943).
"8 In refusing to hold that exemption is precluded by reservation of the
right to change the beneficiary, courts have specifically referred to the
prevalent tendency to include such reservations in modem insurance policies.
See, In re Reiter, 58 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1932), Slurszberg v. Prudential Ins.
Co., 192 Atl. 451 (N.J. 1936).
Very few of the policies now issued would qualify for exemption under
the rule established in the instant case.
[A]ll ... policies as now issued contain provisions which, in effect,
state that unless otherwise provided by endorsement to the policy,
the insured is the owner of the policy. The owner of the policy
,possesses the right to change the beneficiary without the consent or
approval of the beneficiary ... [I]t is believed that the overwhelm-
ing majority . . . of the policies issued in which the husband is the
insured and the wife is named beneficiary, are those in which the
insured-husband is the owner (rather than the beneficiary-
wife) ...
Letter From Robert H. Koonts to David S. Orcutt, March 13, 1967. (Mr.
Koonts is Associate General Counsel for Jefferson Standard Life Insurance
Company, Greensboro, N.C.)
"' See It re Pittman, 275 Fed. 686 (E.D.N.C. 1921). Although Judge
Connor was mistaken as to the power of the trustee to require the bankrupt
to exercise a change of beneficiary, his test for determining if insurance is
for the benefit of the wife seems to be the proper one.
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being for the benefit of the wife.3" Construction of the exemption
provision should be such that it accomplishes its paramount purpose,
the protection of the wife.3' The decision of the district court in
Wolfe defeats that purpose and is contrary to repeated holdings of
bankruptcy referees in the state since the constitutional amendment
and statute were added. 2 It has been suggested that the constitu-
tional amendment only assures that policies of insurance on the
life of the husband are exempt during his life if there is no reserva-
tion of the right to change the beneficiary.33 Such a restrictive inter-
pretation of the effect of the constitutional amendment credits the
legislature with drafting and submitting to the people a constitution-
al amendment, and simultaneously enacting a statute in violation
of that amendment.
While a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court3 4 could
definitely establish the scope of the constitutional exemption, it
is unpredictable when the court would be called upon to decide that
question. A more immediate and effective way to overcome the
unfortunate decision in Wolfe would be to amend the constitutional
provision, making the insurance exemptions available in North
Carolina similar to the exemptions allowed in other jurisdictions.35
This could easily be accomplished by replacing the present language
of the constitutional provision with the wording of North Carolina
General Statute § 58-206.36 DAvID S. ORCUTT
" E.g., In re Reiter, 58 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1932); It re La Tourette,
23 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Mo. 1938); Brown v. Home Life Ins. Co., 3 F.2d
661 (E.D. Okla. 1925);'Slurszberg v. Prudential Ins. Co., 192 AtI. 451
(N.J. 1936).
'IE.g., In re Reiter, 58 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1932); Slurszberg v. Pru-
dential Ins. Co., 193 AtI. 451 (N.J. 1936).
2 See the order of Referee Rufus W. Reynolds in the principal case.
In his conclusions of law, the referee stated:
The undersigned Referee for over nineteen years has been con-
sistently and regularly recognizing the cash surrender of life in-
surance policies on the bankrupt to be exempt where the beneficiary
is the wife or children of the bankrupt even though there is a reser-
vation for a change of beneficiary.
Order of Rufus W. Reynolds, Referee in Bankruptcy, In Matter of Wolfe,
Nos. B-35-65 & B-36-65 (M.D.N.C. 1965).
" Brief for Appellant, p. 4, In- Matter of Wolfe, 249 F. Supp. 784
(M.D.N.C. 1966).
"The North Carolina court apparently has not considered the effect of
the constitution and the statute in a situation where the creditor is seeking
to attack the policy during the life of the insured husband.
"See Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United
States, 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 583 (1957).
(1965).
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